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list

of
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Third

Judicial

District Court is reflected in the caption of the case on the cover
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There are no parties not identified in the caption.

The
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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

The statutory authority which confers jurisdiction on this
Court to hear this appeal is found in §§ 78-2-2(3)(e)(v), 78-22(3) (i) Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, in Rule 54(b) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and in Rule 4(a) of the Rules of the
Utah Supreme Court.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1.

Are the Plaintiffs "aggrieved persons" to the Memorandum

Decision of the Utah State Engineer as the term "aggrieved persons"
is used in § 73-3-14 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended?

The

decision of the Utah State Engineer referred to in this issue is
reproduced in the Addendum,
2.

Do the duties and responsibilities imposed by the Utah

Legislature upon the Utah State Engineer in § 73-3-8 Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, as amended, apply to Permanent Change Applications
which are described, dealt with, and covered by § 73-3-3 Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, as amended?

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

The only constitutional provision whose interpretation the
Plaintiffs believe is determinative is Article 1, Section 11, Utah
Constitution.

This provision is reproduced in the Addendum.

STATUTORY PROVISIONS

Those statutory provisions whose interpretation the Plaintiffs
believe are determinative are Sections 73-3-3, 73-3-8, 73-3-14 Utah
Code Annotated, 1953, as amended.

These provisions are reproduced

in the Addendum.

NATURE OF THE CASE

This case involves a claim by the Plaintiffs against Robert
L. Morgan in his official capacity as the Utah State Engineer in
Count 1 of the Plaintiffs1 Second Amended Complaint, hereafter
"Complaint"

[R. 53].

A claim is also made against the other

Defendants, to-wit: Salt Lake County Water Conservancy District
("D")

and Draper Irrigation Company ("Draper") in the remaining

Counts of the Complaint.
In Count 1, which is the only Count involved in this Appeal,
the Plaintiffs appeal to the District Court from the Memorandum
Decision of the Utah State Engineer.

This Decision

is dated

December 26, 1985, and involves Change Application No. 57-3411
(al3077) .

A copy of this Decision is included in the Addendum.

The Decision describes generally the issues included in the Change
Application, the Protest filed by the plaintiff Stanley B. Bonham,
the hearings held by the Engineer and his investigation.
The Plaintiffs claim the Engineer erred in allowing the other
Defendants' Change Application to be processed and to be approved,

-2-

because it enabled the other Defendants to construct diversion
works to change the manner in which they had theretofore conveyed
water from the vicinity of Bell Canyon Reservoir to the Defendants1
water treatment plant in Draper, Utah.
consisting
constructed

These diversion works

of a screwgate, pipeline and other structures were
on

the

hillside

to

the

property, thereby causing substantial

east

of

the

Plaintiffs1

flooding damage to their

property and also to public property in the vicinity, including
Dimple Dell Road, a proposed site for a public park to be owned by
the Salt Lake County Recreation Department, and to quasi public
irrigation systems.

This flooding damage consists of a virtual

waterfall cascading down the hillside bringing debris, boulders,
and other objects onto the Plaintiffs1 property, thereby destroying
fences, gouging

said property, and interfering with horse and

cattle businesses which each of the Plaintiffs had conducted on
their property
began.

for several years prior to the time the damage

None of this damage occurred prior to the time the Engineer

approved the Change Application.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT

Following
Complaint,

the

and

filing
after

of
the

the

Plaintiffs'

Plaintiffs

Second

submitted

Amended
certain

interrogatories and requests for production of documents [R. 252]
to all defendants, the said Engineer filed a Motion For Summary
Judgment and a Memorandum in support thereof on September 8, 1987

-3-

[R. 293, 300].

At this time the Engineer had not conducted any

discovery of his own nor had the other defendants.

Plaintiffs

filed their Memorandum in opposition to the said motion [R. 474],
On December 4, 1987, the trial judge, Raymond S. Uno, granted the
Engineer's Motion For Summary Judgment, in a Memorandum Decision
[R. 519].

Thereafter a proposed judgment was prepared by the

Engineer's counsel and served upon the other parties [R. 523].
The Defendant Salt Lake County Water Conservancy

District

entered an objection to the Engineer's proposed judgment requesting
that it be identified as a final judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b)
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
filed

his

response

to

the

("URCP") [R. 538].

Conservancy

The Engineer

District's

objections,

stating that Judge Uno's Memorandum Decision did not contemplate
a Rule 54(b) Final Judgment [R. 541].
Thereafter, a hearing was held on January 22, 1988, at which
time counsel for the Plaintiffs was given permission to file legal
authorities dealing with the effect of a Rule 54(b) Judgment on the
proceedings in the District Court.
cited and discussed

These legal authorities were

in a letter dated February

9,

1988, from

Plaintiffs' counsel to Judge Uno, with copies to the other parties
[R. 566]. There were no responsive letters from any other counsel
in opposition to the cases and authorities cited and discussed in
the said letter found at R. 566.
On March 14, 1988, the trial judge signed the "Judgment and
Order Expressly Directing Entry of Judgment Pursuant To Rule 54(b)11
[R. 599]. The Plaintiffs filed their Notice of Appeal on April 11,
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1988.

[R. 609]
There were no evidentiary hearings held by the trial judge in

the District Court, therefore no court reporter's transcript has
been

filed

Judgment

in this Court.

was

discussed

in

decided
the

The Engineer's Motion For Summary

strictly

Engineer's

on

legal

Memorandum

grounds
[R.

as

300]

cited

and

in

and
the

Plaintiffs1 Memorandum in opposition to the said motion for summary
judgment [R. 474].

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

The Plaintiffs seek to reverse the decision of the Honorable
Raymond S. Uno, trial judge, on the grounds his "Judgment and Order
Expressly

Directing Entry of Judgment Pursuant To Rule

constitutes manifest error.

54(b)"

The Plaintiffs seek to have Count 1

of the Second Amended Complaint reinstated, so the Plaintiffs can
pursue their cause of action in the said Count

1 against the

Defendant Robert L. Morgan, Utah State Engineer.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

In

his

"Memorandum

In

Support

of

Defendant

Utah

State

Engineer's Motion For Summary Judgment," [R. 300] the Engineer on
page 2 characterizes the substance of his Motion as follows:
This motion is directed only to Count I of the
Second Amended Complaint, which seeks a de novo appeal
from the Decision of the State Engineer approving the
application of Defendants Draper Irrigation Company and
Salt Lake Water Conservancy District to change the point
-5-

of diversion, place and nature of use of certain water
rights. This motion is not directed toward any of the
claims for relief set forth in the balance of the
Complaint; but since Count I is the only Count involving
Defendant Utah State Engineer, the granting of this
motion would dismiss the appeal of the State Engineer's
Decision approving the change. It will leave the balance
of Plaintiffs1 claims intact, to be addressed on their
own merits, and Plaintiffs will have their day in court
on those claims.
Count 1 of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint ("Complaint")
seeks to review the Memorandum

Decision of the Engineer dated

December 26, 1985, which approved Change Application No. 57-3411
(al3077) filed by the other Defendants Salt Lake County Water
Conservancy District and Draper Irrigation Company [R. 53]. A copy
of the said Memorandum Decision is attached as Exhibit 1 to the
said Complaint and is also included in the Addendum hereto.
The Change Application was filed pursuant to § 73-3-3 Utah
Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, and sought to change the point of
diversion, place and nature of use of certain water rights in Bell
Canyon, the Middle and South Forks of Dry Creek, Rocky Mouth, and
Big Willow Creeks.

Notice of the Change Application was published

in the Deseret News from June 28, 1984, through July 12, 1984.
Plaintiff Stanley B. Bonham filed a timely Protest to the said
Change Application on the grounds the proposed change would cause
flooding and other hazardous conditions to his property and would
also

be detrimental

to the public

welfare.

[See Engineer's

Recitation of Facts in the said Memorandum Decision.]
On

February

26, 1985, a formal hearing

was held

by the

Engineer in his offices in Salt Lake City, Utah, to determine the
merits of the Change Application and also the Protest filed by

-6-

Bonham.

At the hearing, the Plaintiff, his attorney, and private

engineer were present and presented evidence in the form of aerial
photographs,

color

photographs,

and

other

testimony

showing

substantial flooding to the Plaintiffs1 property during 1983 and
1984. This testimony and evidence supported Plaintiffs1 contention
that the Change Application and the structures and improvements to
be installed by the Defendants as a part of the Application would
cause

repeated

flooding

of

the

Plaintiffs' properties,

would

unreasonably effect public recreation, would prove detrimental to
the public welfare, and in fact had already substantially destroyed
portions of the Plaintiffs1 property

[See allegations in Count 1

of the Complaint at R. 53].
In their Complaint, the Plaintiffs allege [and the Plaintiffs
submit these allegations must be accepted as true for the purpose
of

the

Motion

For

Summary

Judgment,

since

there

are

no

contraverting affidavits or other pleadings filed by the Engineer
to refute any of the allegations

in the said Complaint] , the

Engineer failed to review the plans and specifications dealing with
the improvements to be constructed by the Defendants Draper and
District as a part of the Change Application.

The Engineer further

failed to conduct the investigation required by § 73-3-8 Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, as amended, to determine what damage the said
Change Application would have to either private or public property
and whether the Change Application would prove detrimental to the
public welfare.

The Plaintiffs further claim the Engineer also

failed to comply with the provisions of § 73-3-3(2) Utah Code
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Annotated,

1953, as amended, in that the Engineer

consider the duties of the applicants —
District —

failed to

Draper and Conservancy-

in connection with the Change Application to the same

degree and with the same emphasis the Engineer would be required
to consider these same duties, if the other Defendants had filed
an original water application under § 73-3-2.
Approximately

ten months after this formal hearing, the

Engineer entered his Memorandum Decision.

Although the Engineer

allowed the Plaintiff Bonham to file a timely and formal protest,
and even though he held a hearing on the said protest, and
allegedly

investigated

the

issues involving the protest, the

Engineer stated in paragraph 1 on page 2 of his Memorandum Decision
that he was "without authority relative to damages which may have
been sustained
occurred

as

in connection with project construction which
a

applications...".

result

of

his

reaction

to

water

right

This conclusion was made in flagrant disregard

of the clear mandate of § 73-3-8 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as
amended, which imposes a statutory duty upon the Engineer to
investigate any and all damage to public or private property and
the impact the Application will have upon the public welfare.
In their Complaint, the Plaintiffs allege they had lived
peaceably on their properties in Sandy, Utah, for approximately 20
years without being flooded by water in the ditches owned by the
other Defendants, Draper Irrigation Company and Salt Lake County
Water Conservancy District.

The Plaintiffs1 properties consist

generally of ten or more acres of ground which are described in

-8-

Exhibits 1 and 2 attached to the Complaint [R. 53]. The Plaintiffs
each had a cattle and horse business operating on their properties.
The Plaintiffs allege that for approximately 100 years since the
time

the

Defendant

Draper

Irrigation

Company

first

began

to

construct open ditches, flumes, pipelines, and other structures to
carry water from the vicinity of Bell Canyon Reservoir to Draper's
Water Treatment Plant in Draper, Utah, the water had been carried
with no adverse consequences to the Plaintiffs1 property.
the

2 0 years

or

so

the

Plaintiffs

owned

and

occupied

During
their

properties, there was no more than a trickle of water that ever
drained down the hillside to the east of their properties, and none
of this water ever caused any annoyance, nuisance or damage to
person or property.
However, commencing in the spring of 1983, as a sole, direct
and proximate cause of the negligence of the Defendant Engineer in
granting preliminary approval to the Change Application described
above,

the

said

Engineer

permitted

an

inherently

dangerous

condition to exist on the hillside immediately to the east of the
Plaintiffs'

properties.

This

inherently

dangerous

condition

allowed the other Defendants to convey substantial waters from one
natural watershed to another and to do so without any authority or
permit from the Salt Lake County Flood Control and Public Works
Department.

The

Engineer

authorized

the

construction

of

a

screwgate, pipeline and diversion works which had not formerly
existed.

These changes allowed the water which had been routinely,

for the past 100 years or so, conveyed without incident from the

-9-

Bell Canyon reservoir area to the Water Treatment Plant in Draper,
Utah, to now be diverted down the hillside, immediately to the east
of Plaintiffs1 properties, causing a virtual waterfall to cascade
down

the

hill,

causing

tremendous

damage

to

property and the public property in the area.

the

Plaintiffs'

The Plaintiffs'

properties were gutted, fences were destroyed, deep ravines and
crevices were carved out, large boulders and other debris as well
as silt were deposited on the properties.
roads and properties

belonging

In addition, public

to the Salt Lake County

Parks

Department were destroyed, along with irrigation ditches belonging
to other ditch companies.

[See allegations in Counts 1-3 of the

Complaint at R. 53].
All this damage was done without notice to the Plaintiffs,
without

their

whatsoever.

approval,

and

without

obtaining

any

consent

Damage occurred in 1983, against in 1984, and will

occur every year in the future when the Defendants close their
screwgate, allowing waters from the Middle Fork and South Fork of
Dry

Creek

to

be

diverted

down

the hillside

upon

Plaintiffs'

properties; rather than to be conveyed in a pipeline or an open
ditch to the Defendants' Water Treatment Plaint in Draper, Utah,
as had been done for decades prior to 1983.
All of the foregoing "Factual Allegations" are set forth in
detail in Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint [R. 53].
since there have been

no affidavits

contraverting

Again,

any of

the

allegations in the said Complaint, this Court must accept those
allegations

as

true

for

the

purpose

-10-

of

motions

for

summary

judgment.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The Plaintiffs submit the Defendant Utah State Engineer is
jointly and severally liable with the other Defendants in this
action for the inherently dangerous condition which the Engineer
authorized

on

properties.

the

hillside

to

the

east

of

the

Plaintiffs1

The Engineer was an active participant and expressly

approved the offending diversion works and screwgate which allows
severe flooding damage to occur to private and public properties
each time the screwgate is closed by the Defendants.
None of the cases cited by the Engineer in his Memorandum in
Support of his Motion For summary Judgment [R. 3 00] deal with the
issues raised in this instant lawsuit and not one of the cases
discusses the definition of "aggrieved parties" in § 73-3-14 UCA,
1953,

as

imposed

amended,

upon

or whether

the duties

the State Engineer by

and

§ 73-3-8

responsibilities
apply

to

Change

Applications.
The Plaintiffs submit the core issue before this Court is
whether the Utah State Engineer has complied with the requirements
in §§ 73-3-3(2) and 73-3-8 to conduct an adequate investigation to
determine whether the Change Application will prove detrimental to
the public welfare, will unreasonably affect public recreation or
the natural stream environment. The Engineer argues he has no duty
to make the required investigation, the Plaintiffs contend he does.

-11-

The

Engineer

admits

he

has

these

duties

of

investigation

in

connection with an original water application filed pursuant to §
73-3-2, but he is merely a "bump on a log" and can close his eyes
to any damage to private or public property when he is considering
Permanent Change Applications under § 73-3-3.

[See R. 309 note 1

in the Engineer's Memorandum where he admits "Interests other than
impairment of water rights are considered by the State Engineer in
passing

an

applications

to appropriate

water

under

§ 73-3-8,

but...such criteria do not apply to Change Applications."

No

citations are given to support this proposition, and no cases have
ever

been

cited

by

the

Engineer

which

hold

permanent

Change

Applications do not need to be investigated to the same extent as
original

water

applications.

The

instant cases

are of

first

impression on this issue!]
With respect to "aggrieved parties," the Engineer cites lower
federal court cases dealing with the "Zone of Interest" test, a
test not found in any Utah statutes or Utah Supreme Court cases
containing the state's water laws found in Title 73 of the Water
Code.
that

Furthermore, the Engineer has omitted to state to this Court
these

lower

federal

court decisions

discussing

"Zone

of

Interest" have been modified by a 1987 United States Supreme Court
decision which
Procedure Act

interpreted

§ 10 of the Federal

Administrative

(APA) , 5 U.S.C. § 702 [5 U.S.C.S. § 702], which

"grants standing to a person aggrieved by agency action within the
meaning of a relevant statute."

The court interpreted this § 10

to grant "generous review procedures" to aggrieved persons and

-12-

further refused to follow the "narrow construction" placed upon §
10 by earlier federal cases and by the Comptroller of the Currency.
Clarke v. Securities Industries Association, 479 U.S.

, 107

S.Ct. 750, 93 L.Ed.2d 757 (1987).
The United

States Supreme Court held the term

"aggrieved

person" in § 10 of the APA should be construed "not grudgingly but
as

serving

a

broadly

remedial

discussed in more detail below.

purpose."

This

case

will

be

This "narrow construction" of the

term "aggrieved persons" adopted by the lower federal courts, is
the same one adopted by the Utah State Engineer in his Memorandum
[R. 300].

Counsel for the Engineer knew about this case because

it was discussed orally at the hearing on August 6, 1987, yet
counsel failed to bring this case to the attention of the Trial
Court in his Memorandum.

The only apparent reason for counsel's

failure to cite this latest pronouncement on "Zone of Interest" by
the highest court in the country is no doubt because counsel was
aware the case argues against the position taken by the Engineer.
Finally, the Plaintiffs submit the Motion for Summary Judgment
is far too premature
considered.

at this early

stage

in the

case to be

The Engineer has not undertaken any discovery, nor has

the Engineer responded to the Discovery Documents submitted by the
Plaintiffs

[R.

252-254].

Plaintiffs

submit

that

only

after

adequate discovery has been completed, can this case be in a
position to entertain Motions for Summary Judgment, and until that
time all such motions should be denied.
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POINT 1
THE UTAH STATE ENGINEER'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS NOT
RIPE FOR DETERMINATION BECAUSE:
1.
submit

The Engineer has not conducted any discovery, nor did he
any

affidavits

contraverting

the

allegations

in

the

Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint;
2.

There is a factual dispute whether the Engineer properly

performed

his

statutory

duties

found

in

5

73-3-8

Utah

Code

Annotated, 1953, as amended, to investigate the Change Application
and to determine its effect on the public welfare;
3.

The granting

of the Engineer's motion

dismissed

the

Second Amended Complaint as to the Engineer, thereby violating the
Courts' "open door" policy stated in Article I, Section 11. of the
Utah Constitution.
1.
submit

The Engineer has not conducted any discovery, nor did he
any

affidavits

contraverting

Plaintiffs1 Second Amended Complaint.
filed

his

Motion

For

Summary

the

allegations

in

the

At the time the Engineer

Judgment

[R.

293-295]

and

his

Memorandum in support of the said Motion [R. 300-328] , the said
Engineer had not undertaken any discovery proceedings whatsoever.
No depositions had been taken, and the Engineer had not submitted
any

interrogatories,

requests

requests for admissions.

for production

of

documents

or

The only discovery outstanding at that

time was that undertaken by the Plaintiff

in submitting

both

interrogatories and requests for production of documents to the
Engineer and to the other two Defendants [R. 252-254].
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Nor did the Engineer submit any affidavits contravening any
of the allegations in the Plaintiffs1 Second Amended Complaint.
The only affidavit submitted was that of Kent Jones stating he had
checked the records in the office of the Engineer and could not
find any evidence of the Plaintiffs owning any water rights in the
Defendants' ditch facilities which were the subject of the Change
Application [R. 291-292].
of the statements

This affidavit does not impact on any

in the Second Amended

Complaint and

is not

material to the issues raised in either the Memorandum filed by the
Engineer in the Trial Court [R. 300] or by the Plaintiffs [R. 474].
Under
Engineer's

these

circumstances,

Motion

For

Summary

determination at this time.

the

Plaintiffs

Judgment

is

submit

the

ripe

for

not

Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil

Procedure, "URCP", provides summary judgment "shall be rendered
forthwith

if

interrogatories,

the
and

pleadings,
admissions

depositions,
on

file,

answers

together

with

to
the

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the Engineer is entitled to a judgment as
a matter of law."

Since the Engineer has not undertaken any

discovery nor filed any affidavits in opposition to the allegations
in the Second Amended Complaint, these allegations must be taken
as true.

What the Engineer is attempting to do is to stop further

proceedings against himself and to prevent the Plaintiffs from
having a trial with respect to the allegations in their Complaint.
This Court has held on numerous occasions "summary judgment
should be granted only when it is clear from the undisputed facts
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that the opposing party cannot prevail.

In considering a summary

judgment motion, the Court must evaluate all the evidence and all
reasonable inferences fairly drawn from the evidence in a light
most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment."
Williams, 739 P.2d 634 (Utah 1987).

Conder v.

This Court has also held that

under Rule 56, summary judgment shall be rendered only if the
record demonstrates that there

is no genuine

issue as to any

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law.

Doubts or uncertainties concerning issues of fact

properly presented, or the nature of inferences to be drawn from
the facts, are to be construed in a light favorable to the party
opposing the summary judgment.

Webster v. Sill, 675 P. 2d 1170

(Utah 1983) . See also Utah Farm Production Credit v. Wasatch Bank.
734 P.2d 904 (Utah 1987).
Applying these general principles to the case at hand, it is
clear Count 1 of the Second Amended Complaint does state a cause
of action against the Utah State Engineer for the reasons set forth
hereafter in Points 2. 3 and 4 of this Brief.

In Crafts v. Hansen,

667 P.2d 1068 (Utah 1985), this Court recognized on page 1081, "It
is noteworthy that none of the respondents have, so far as we can
determine, cited a single case wherein the Trial Court upheld an
order of the State Engineer in a water dispute by summary judgment
on the basis of opinion, testimony and affidavits.

Every case

discussed by the respondents was decided after a fair trial in
District Court."

Similarly, in the instant case, every case cited

by the Engineer in his Memorandum in support of his Motion For
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Summary Judgment [R. 300] involved a full trial in the District
Court.

Not only has there been no trial in the instant case, but

the Engineer has neglected to file any affidavits contravening the
allegations in the Second Amended Complaint. The Plaintiffs invite
this

Court

to

read

the

allegations

in

Count

1 of

the

said

Complaint, which Count is primarily directed toward the Engineer.
Paragraph 9 of the Complaint states at the hearing held in
the Engineerfs office, the Plaintiffs1 private engineer, Jack L.
DeMass, presented evidence to demonstrate that the Plaintiffs1
property and the public welfare had been detrimentally, adversely,
and negatively affected by the Change Application approved by the
Engineer.

In paragraph 10, the Plaintiffs allege the Engineer, by

approving the Change Application, allowed the other Defendants to
change the natural flow of water in certain natural tributaries in
Salt Lake County, and also to divert water from one watershed to
another, to change open ditches to underground pipelines, to change
points

of

structures,

diversion,
and

to

to

build

metering

otherwise change

the

stations,

overflow

course, channel, and

conveyance of water from the Bell Canyon Reservoir to the other
Defendants1 water treatment plant.

In paragraph 11 the Plaintiffs

alleged the action of the Engineer impacts upon natural tributaries
in Salt

Lake County without complying with the

ordinances

in

the

County,

and

without

flood

complying

with

control
other

provisions of the Utah State statutes and without obtaining the
requisite permit from the Salt Lake County Department of Storm
Drainage and Flood Control, from the Salt Lake County Public Works
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Department, and from other Salt Lake County and State of Utah
offices and agencies.
In paragraph 12 of the said Complaint, the Plaintiffs allege
the Engineer made only a cursory investigation of the complaints
and protests made by the Plaintiffs, but did not undertake any indepth

investigation,

nor

did

he

conduct

his

own

independent

engineering inspection and investigation of the property in any
intelligent way to determine whether the public welfare would be
adversely and negatively affected by the Change Application.
Again, all of these allegations in paragraphs 9, 10, 11 and
12 and other paragraphs of the said Complaint must be taken as
true,

since

the

Engineer

has

not

submitted

any

affidavits

controverting these allegations.
2.

There is a factual dispute whether the Engineer properly

performed his statutory duties pursuant to the provisions of 5 733-8, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. as amended, to investigate the
Change Application to determine whether it would prove detrimental
to the public welfare.

This issue is more fully discussed in Point

4 of this Brief, which Point 4 of the argument is by reference
incorporated herein and made a part hereof.
of this

Court

provide

that

in a Rule

Again, the holdings

56 Motion

For

Summary

Judgment, the allegations in the Second Amended Complaint must be
taken as true, since they are not controverted by any discovery or
affidavit from the Engineer.
3.

The granting of the Engineer's Motion violated the "open

door" access to the courts policy stated in Article 1, Section 11,
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of the Utah Constitution.
substantial

damage

to

The Second Amended Complaint shows

private

and

public

property

which

was

proximately caused by the action of the Engineer in approving the
Change Application submitted by the other Defendants.

In Lewis v.

Pinqree National Bank, 47 U.35, 151 P.588, this Court held a right
of action exists for any injury or damage to private property, and
neither the Legislature nor municipalities can interfere with that
right.

In Utah State University v. Sutro & Co. . 646 P. 2d 715 (Utah

1982), this Court further held the constitution assures access to
the courts for the protection of rights and redress of wrongs;
therefore, summary judgment which denies the opportunity of trial
should

be

granted

only

when

it clearly

appears

there

is

no

reasonable probability the party moved against could prevail.

In

the instant case, and as will be pointed out hereafter in this
Brief, there is much "reasonable probability" the Plaintiffs could
prevail in the action in the District Court.
For

the

foregoing

reasons,

the

Plaintiffs

submit

the

Engineer's Motion For Summary Judgment is premature and is not ripe
for determination at this time, and is further violative of the
provisions of Article I, Section 11, of the Utah

Constitution

providing open access to the courts and opportunity for trial.

POINT 2
THE PLAINTIFFS ARE "AGGRIEVED PERSONS" WITHIN THE MEANING OF
§ 73-3-14 UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, AS AMENDED, BECAUSE THE
PLAINTIFFS HAVE A DIRECT, PERSONAL AND ECONOMIC INTEREST IN THE
PROPERTY AFFECTED BY THE ENGINEER'S MEMORANDUM DECISION, AND
BECAUSE THEIR PROPERTIES HAVE BEEN SEVERELY DAMAGED AND WILL BE
REPEATEDLY DAMAGED IN THE FUTURE AS A DIRECT AND PROXIMATE RESULT
-19-

OF THE CONDUCT OF THE ENGINEER IN APPROVING THE CHANGE APPLICATION.
In the Engineer's Memorandum in support of his Motion For
Summary Judgment

[R. 300] on pages 6-16

thereof, the Engineer

discusses the issue of whether Plaintiffs are "aggrieved persons"
under § 73-3-14 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended.
this discussion

Most of

[R. 309-316] deals with the "Zone of Interest"

argument which is not found anywhere in the Utah Water laws.

The

Engineer argues Utah should follow certain federal court decisions.
This "Zone of Interest" concept has not been adopted

in Utah.

However, since it has been raised, the Plaintiffs will discuss it
separately in POINT 3 below.

The Plaintiffs will discuss a United

States Supreme Court case decided in 1987 which disposes of this
issue

of

"aggrieved

discussion

in

persons"

Point

3

of

Association, 479 U.S.
With

respect

adverse
Clarke

to

v.

the

Engineer.

Securities

See

Industries

, 107 S.Ct. 750, 93 L.Ed.2d 757 (1987).

to

the

three

pages,

[R.

306-309]

in

the

Engineer's Memorandum which attempt to discuss § 73-3-14 without
the "Zone of Interest" dialogue, the Plaintiffs submit the Engineer
missed the point completely of what this case is all about 1

All

the cases cited by the Engineer stand for the proposition that "A
water

user,

Application
detriment

even

with

increase
of

other

Memorandum at R. 3 08.
of law.

an

its

earlier

priority,

cannot

historic

depletion

of

existing

water

users."

by

water
See

Change
to

the

Engineer's

The Plaintiffs admit this general principle

The Plaintiffs also admit the holdings in several of the

other cases cited by the Engineer which all deal with conflicts
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between competing water users who both have claimed vested water
rights.
However, the Plaintiffs submit there is not one comment in any
of these

cases cited

by the Engineer which

defines

"aggrieved persons" nor what the Utah legislature

the

intended by

including these words in § 73-3-14, Utah Code Annotated.
in Engineer's Memorandum

term

Nowhere

[R. 300-328] is this issue discussed.

Without any cases to support the Engineer's interpretation of § 733-14, his interpretation in his Memorandum is the Engineer's own
private interpretation and is not entitled to any weight whatsoever
by this court.

The Plaintiffs will cite several cases which

specifically interpret the term "any aggrieved person" in statutes
identical

to

§§

73-3-14

similarly

situated

as

and

the

73-3-15, and

Plaintiffs

are

which

hold

clearly

persons

"aggrieved

persons".
Section 73-3-14 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, reads
in part as follows:

"In any case where the decision of the State

Engineer is involved, any person aggrieved by the decision may
within sixty days after notice bring a civil action in the District
Court for a plenary review..." (emphasis added).

Again the key

term is "any person aggrieved" by the decision of the Engineer.
The fact the legislature chose to use the word "any" two times in
the first fourteen words of this section indicates a legislative
intent to make the appeal process as broad as possible.

The cases

cited hereafter also adopt this broad interpretation of the term
"any person aggrieved."
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The Utah legislature said "any case" and "any person."

The

Engineer in his Memorandum in the trial court, and presumably in
his Brief to be filed in this Court, spotlights the term "vested
water rights" and impairment of such rights.

He argues a person

cannot be aggrieved unless he has some "vested water rights" even
though his property may be wiped out as effectively as by an
earthquake by the change application. However, in § 73-3-14, there
is no attempt to restrict the persons entitled to plenary review
in the District Court to-only those who have "vested water rights."
Had the legislature wanted to so restrict the plenary review to
only those with "vested water rights," the legislature could have
clearly done so with appropriate language.
The "Zone of Interest" concept contended for by the Engineer
in his Memorandum does not require the "persons aggrieved" to
appear in the administrative proceedings.
discussing the "Zone of Interest" issue.

See POINT 3 below

Yet the Engineer argues

the plaintiffs other than Stanley B. Bonham- have no standing,
because they did not file a formal "Protes" nor appear at the
hearing in the Engineer's office. The Plaintiff Stanley B. Bonham
was a formal protestant, did file a protest, did appear at the
hearing, and his problems allegedly were investigated by the
Engineer.

The fact the other Plaintiffs did not formally appear

in these administrative proceedings, is not fatal to their cause
of action, and all the cases construing the term "any aggrieved
person" hold the definition of the term does not require a person
to be a party to the state agency proceedings, nor do they need to
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have even an economic interest in the proceedings, so long as they
can show a direct, personal interest. Kramer v. Government of the
Virgin Islands, 453 F.2d 1245 (3rd Cir. 1971), Tanner v. City of
Boulder, 151 Colo. 283, 377 P.2d 945 (1962), and Clarke, supra.
The Plaintiffs submit Kramer, supra, is virtually identical
to the instant case, and disposes of all the arguments made by the
Engineer with respect to how the language "any person aggrieved"
in § 73-3-14 should be interpreted. In Kramer, the Plaintiffs were
owners of property directly overlooking the site of a proposed
drive-in theater.

They appealed from an order of the District

Court of the Virgin Islands dismissing their Complaint on the
grounds that since they were not parties in the proceedings before
the Board of Appeals, they had no standing to seek review of the
Board's decision under the applicable statutes. The statute in the
Kramer case is virtually identical to its Utah counterpart.

That

statute provided in part as follows:
Any person aggrieved by any decision of the Board
may seek review of the same by the District Court of the
Virgin Islands. Appeal for such review must be made
within thirty days of receipt of decision by the person
seeking review. (emphasis added).
The District Court reasoned that since the time within which
review may be brought runs from the date the would-be Plaintiff
receives the Boardfs decision, and since the Board would notify
only those parties before it, it followed that persons who are not
parties before the Board cannot come within the class of "any
persons aggrieved."

This argument is exactly like the argument

made by the Engineer in his Motion for Summary Judgment.
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The

Engineer argues the Plaintiffs other than Stanley B. Bonham were
not parties

to the proceedings
not

in the Engineer's

"aggrieved"

by

the

Engineer's

office, and

therefore

were

Memorandum

Decision.

The language used in the Virgin Island statute is even

stronger in support of his conclusion than the language in 73-314.

However, Kramer holds against the Engineer and not only

interprets what the term "any person aggrieved by any decision"
means, but also stated it is not necessary for a party to appear
in the administrative proceedings to be an "aggrieved person."
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third

Circuit

reversed the U.S. District Court and determined the legislative
intent by the simple wording of the statute which is identical to
"S 73-3-14 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended.

The Circuit

Court held the legislature's intent was to allow appeal rights even
though the persons had not formally appeared in the administrative
proceeding.

Again the key to interpreting the legislative intent

was the use of the word "any" just as in the Utah water laws.
[1-3] We cannot agree with the District Court's
interpretation. The Virgin Islands Legislature chose the
words 'any person aggrieved by any decisions' (emphasis
added) to delineate the class of persons granted the
right of review under this statute. It is a well settled
rule of statutory construction that the legislature must
be presumed to use words in their known and ordinary
significance [citing United States Supreme Court and
other federal court cases].
Application of this
principle to the instant case can lead to but one result.
'Any person aggrieved by any decision' encompasses all
persons who were aggrieved by any decision of the Board
of Appeals, not just parties before the Board. The only
limitation upon the class is that they be aggrieved. The
30-day period in which an appeal must be taken is not a
limitation upon the class of persons granted a right of
appeal but rather an attempt to limit the time in which
an appeal may be taken. In determining whether or not
a person is aggrieved, federal courts have held that to
-24-

be aggrieved an affected party need not have a personal
economic interest.
He needs only to show a direct
personal interest.
See Scenic Hudson Preservation
Conference v. Federal Power Commission, 354 F.2d 608, 615
(C.A.2, 1965), cert, denied, Consolidated Edison Co. of
N.Y., Inc. v. Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference, 384
U.S. 941, 86 S.Ct. 1462, 16 L.Ed.2d 5040 (1966). In that
case, the court in interpreting a statute similar to the
statute involved in the instant case held:
Those who by their activities and conduct
have exhibited a special interest in such
areas, must be held to be included in the
class of 'aggrieved1 parties * * *.M 3 54 F. 2d
616.
Appellants in the
landowners in the
proposed drive-in
personal interest

instant case meet this criterion. As
area of and overlooking the site of a
theater, they have a special and direct
in its location. (emphasis added).

Similarly, in the instant case, the Plaintiffs have alleged
in their Second Amended Complaint their personal, economic, and
direct

interest

in the Engineer's Memorandum

Decision.

They

alleged the Engineer's approval of the Change Application violates
their rights as owners of property in that the Defendants are
permitted

solely

by

virtue

of

the

changes

allowed

in

their

Application to unreasonably discharge virtual waterfalls on the
Plaintiffs1

properties at the Defendants' sole whim and will,

whenever the screwgate is lowered in the Defendants' diversion
structure.
In Tanner, supra, the Colorado Supreme Court held a statute
authorizing "any person aggrieved" by any annexation proceeding to
obtain judicial relief is not limited to those who are entitled to
protest as landowners in the area to be annexed, but the statute
includes any person who shows he is in fact aggrieved by the
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offending ordinance*

Similarly, in the instant case, even if none

of the Plaintiffs had appeared as protestants in the hearing on
Defendants' joint Change Application, they would
precluded

from

filing

"aggrieved persons."
Stanley

B.

Bonham

this

action

in

the

still not be

District

Court

as

However, as everyone admits, the Plaintiff

did

file

a

formal protest pursuant

to

the

provisions of § 73-3-7, and the Engineer does not challenge his
standing to file a protest, which that section states must be "duly
considered by the state engineer."
The

Engineer

also

treated

the

Plaintiffs

persons" during his administrative proceedings.

as

"aggrieved

If the issue of

"aggrieved persons" is as simple as the Engineer contends in its
Memorandum it is, then why did the Engineer hold a formal hearing
on the Bonham protest in February, 1985, make an on-site field
investigation of the Plaintiffs1 properties and the Defendants1
improvements in May of 1985, and then wait an additional seven
months

to

further

investigate
on

this matter

Memorandum

Decision

December

"aggrieved

parties" involves only

26,

before

1985?

"impairment

If

issuing

the

issue

of vested

his
of

water

rights," the Engineer could easily have disposed of this matter in
a summary fashion, since he knew the Plaintiffs did not own any
vested water rights. See the affidavit of the Engineer's Employee,
Kent Jones, verifying the Plaintiffs had no vested water rights.
[R. 291-292].
In his Memorandum, the Engineer acknowledges at the hearing
in the District Court on August 6, 1987, on the Plaintiffs1 Motion
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To Strike Certain Defenses, the Court told counsel for the Engineer
he had some reservations about the issue of "aggrieved parties" and
also other issues as raised in the Engineer's Memorandum.

[See R.

3 02 of the Engineer's Memorandum which acknowledges this concern
on the part of the Court at the August 6 hearing.]
expressed

concern

over

Article

1

Section

11

The Court
of

the

Utah

Constitution which states all courts will be open for a redress of
any injuries done to the parties, and no person should be deprived
of their right to come into court. The trial judge also raised the
question as to why shouldn't the duties of the State Engineer in
§ 7 3-3-8 apply as much to Change Applications as to Original
Applications in order to ensure the public welfare was protected
as required by § 73-3-8.
The issues involving the Engineer's duties to undertake the
investigation described in § 73-3-8 are discussed in POINT 4,
infra.

The important aspect of the trial judge's comments with

respect to this POINT 2, is that he did express reservations about
the Plaintiffs not being able to pursue their remedies in the
courts if the interpretation placed on § 73-3-14 by the State
Engineer was correct. The Plaintiffs submit it was not correct for
all of the reasons set forth in this POINT 2 and the other POINTS
in this memorandum, and also for the following reasons:
The Engineer, throughout his Memorandum, appears to be taking
the position he is above the law, and Plaintiffs have no right to
commence

legal

action against the Engineer, even though the

Engineer's action triggered the very damage which the Plaintiffs

-27-

experienced and which could in the future wipe out a large part of
their real estate.

Obviously the Engineer's interpretation shuts

the Court's doors to any redress by the Plaintiffs.

This is

contrary to the express provisions of Article 1 Section 11 of the
Utah Constitution stating that all courts will be open.

The Utah

Supreme Court has also held the power of the State Engineer is not
absolute!
case.

The Engineer is asking for judicial immunity in this

This Court hit this argument head on and dismissed it as

being without merit.

In American Fork Irrigation Company, et al.

v. Link, et al. , 239 P.2d 188 (1951), Justice Henroid held in part
as follows:
[1]
We need not discuss at length defendants'
contention that the engineer's conclusion as to the
practicability of administering a proposed change should
remain invalid and immune from judicial review or
reversal.
Recently
this court negatived
such
contentions, announcing that the engineer's findings and
decisions have a sanctity extending no further than the
authority delegated by law to his office. Also that such
findings and decisions, administrative in nature, merit
studied consideration at great length, nevertheless the
judiciary is the sole ultimate arbiter of law and fact
in water cases, bound neither by the nature, extent or
content of his decision, nor as to the character, quantum
or guality of proof, evidence or data deduced at hearings
before him or accumulated independently by his office.
Our legislature obviously invested him with important but
not conclusive discretionary powers and duties deserving
of great respect, but as a safeguard against possible
injustice, and by plenary review on trial de novo, it
also invested the court with the ultima ratio and final
say as to the conflicting contentions of applicant and
protestant. For example, where the application is for
appropriation of water, the court may receive and
consider competent and admissible evidence dehors the
record, findings, data, or decision developed in the
Engineer's office relating thereto... [emphasis added].
Similar in the instant case, and since the Engineer has not
conducted any discovery whatsoever nor controverted any of the
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allegations in the Second Amended Complaint, the Engineer and this
Court must assume these allegations are true and admit Plaintiffs1
properties

will

be

damaged

by

the

improvements

which

are

constructed as a part of the Change Application approved by the
Engineer.
allegations

The Engineer must further admit as true all the
in

the

Second

Amended

Complaint

describing

the

extensive damage to Plaintiffs1 properties and their cattle and
horse business as a sole and proximate result of the Engineer's
approval of the Change Application.

None of the flooding damage

to the Plaintiffs1 properties occurred prior to the time the Change
Application was approved.

Even though the Engineer admits the

Change Application and improvements constructed pursuant thereto
are the direct and proximate cause of the damage to the Plaintiffs1
properties, the Engineer still argues he is immune from judicial
review in this action.

Obviously such a position is contrary to

the Utah Constitution and the interpretation of every state and
federal court which has construed the terms "any aggrieved person."
Again, since the Engineer has not cited one case defining the
critical term "any aggrieved person," the Plaintiffs submit the
holdings of the courts in this Memorandum must control, and the
Engineer's Motion For Summary Judgment should be denied.
Section 73-3-14 allows judicial "plenary" review in a trial
de novo. Plenary review is the broadest of all types of appellate
examination.

The word "plenary" means full, entire, complete,

absolute, perfect, unqualified.

Mashunkashey v. Mashunkashey, et

aL./ 134 P.2d 976, 979 (Okl. 1942).
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Plenary review has also been

defined as a "full review, a complete review."

D&RGWRRR v. PSC,

98 Utah 431 100 P.2d 552, 555 (1940).
The United States Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has discussed
the issue of

"standing" with respect to Rule 24(a)(2) of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "FRCP".

Sanguine, Ltd. v. U.S.

Department of Interior, 736 F.2d 1416 (10th Cir. 1984) and Natural
Resources

Defense

Council,

Inc.

v.

U.S.

Commission, 578 F.2d 1341 (10th Cir. 1978).

Nuclear

Regulatory

In Natural Resources,

the Tenth Circuit dealt with the sufficiency of an interest to
support standing in judicial review.

The Court held the interest

to sue does not hinge on a direct interest, that construction being
too narrow.

The Court held the parties1 standing can be rejected

only if it can be shown there is no property

interest of any

character that could be impaired by the outcome. The Court further
held such an interest did not even have to be a direct interest.
In this case, the Tenth Circuit recognized

a claim that bird

feathers were ecologically threatened was an insufficient interest
to maintain an action.
In Sanguine, supra, the Tenth Circuit further held that where
nine individuals sought to intervene in an action involving a
mineral lease, the said individuals had standing to sue under Rule
24(a)(2) FRCP, since they could show a direct ecomonic benefit in
a ruling which might be favorable to them.

The government resisted

the intervention on the grounds of untimeliness and also upon the
failure of the nine intervenors to show an interest "relating to
the property or transaction which is the subject to the action"
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under Rule 24.
It is recognized these two Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
cases deal with litigation in the United States District Court
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
an appeal of an administrative agency.

They do not involve

The United States Supreme

Court in Clarke, supra, has greatly enlarged the rights of judicial
review to those persons who are aggrieved because of the decision
of a state administrative agency.

In this sense, the instant case

involving the Utah State Engineer is more like the administrative
procedures cases cited in Clarke, than the Tenth Circuit Court
cases.

However, the Tenth Circuit Court cases are cited simply to

show that even in direct actions, as opposed

to appeals from

administrative bodies, the courts are willing to consider the
question of standing and to enlarge the group protected.
example,

in

intervenors
litigation.

Sanguine, the Tenth
did
The

have

Circuit

sufficient

Court

stated

Court

interest
their

held

to

For

the

nine

maintain

the

interpretation

of

the

"interest" requirement was a "practical guide to disposing of
lawsuits by involving as many apparently concerned persons as is
compatible with...due process."
In

1A

C.J.S.

444

Actions

736 F.2d 1420.
§ 58, the

author

defines

aggrieved party" as one suffering a direct and actual damage

"an
—

"...the party to sue is one whose right, or a duty to whom, has
been violated...".
For the reasons discussed above, the Plaintiffs submit they
are "aggrieved persons" as that term is used in § 73-3-14 and 15
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Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended.
The Engineer relies upon the case of Crafts v. Hansen, 667
P. 2d 168 (Utah 1983) and cites this case several times in his Trial
Memorandum [R. 300].

The Crafts case did not answer any of the

issues raised in the instant case.

Crafts did not discuss whether

the Plaintiffs would be "aggrieved parties" under § 73-3-14 under
the circumstances in this case.

In fact, §§ 73-3-14 and 15 were

not even involved in Crafts. Furthermore, this Court in Crafts did
not

discuss

whether

the

Engineer's

statutory

duties

of

investigation described in § 73-3-8 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as
amended, apply to Permanent Change Applications described in § 733-3.

Since neither of these critical issues, which are the only

issues presented for review in the instant case, were discussed in
Crafts, the Plaintiffs do not understand the Engineer's citation
to Crafts.

Actually, Crafts recognizes prior motions of the Utah

State Engineer for Summary Judgment have never been decided on the
basis of affidavits only, but always after a full trial of the
issues.

In our case, the Engineer has not even filed opposing or

controverting affidavits as was the case in Crafts.

With respect

to this issue, the Court stated on page 1080 of the Pacific 2d
Reporter as follows:
It is noteworthy that none of the respondents have,
so far as we can determine, cited a single case wherein
the trial court upheld an order of the State Engineer in
a water dispute by summary judgment on the basis of
opinion testimony and affidavits. Every case discussed
by the respondents was decided after a full trial in the
District Court...The fact that summary disposition of
such cases appears to have been rare or nonexistent does
underscore the nature and kind of evidence likely to be
relied on by the parties therein, and offered by the
parties here.
-32-

If the Engineer's Motion For Summary Judgment is granted, the
Plaintiffs1 cause of action against the Engineer will be dismissed
with prejudice.

The Plaintiffs submit such a result under the

circumstances of this case at the time the Motion For Summary
Judgment

was

controverting

filed,

and without

affidavits

filed

any

by

discovery

the

proceedings

Engineer,

violates

or
the

provisions of Article I, Section 11, of the Utah Constitution which
provides in part, "All courts shall be open, and every person, for
an injury done to him and his person, property or reputation, shall
have remedy by due course of law, which shall be administered
without denial or unnecessary delay;...".

See the Plaintiffs1

discussion of this constitutional provision in Point 1, supra, and
paragraph 3 therein.
Again, the issues presented to this Court in this case are
ones of first impression, and there are no Utah cases which the
Engineer has cited which even remotely discuss the issues involved
under the factual circumstances in this case.

POINT 3
THE PLAINTIFFS ARE WITHIN THE "ZONE OF INTEREST" TEST
DISCUSSED ON PAGES 9-16 OF THE ENGINEER'S MEMORANDUM, BECAUSE THE
PLAINTIFFS HAVE SUSTAINED BOTH A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC DAMAGE, BECAUSE
THEY ARE WITHIN THE CLASS OF PERSONS THE LEGISLATURE SOUGHT TO
PROTECT WHEN IT ENACTED § 73-3-14, AND BECAUSE THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT DECIDED IN 1987, THE TERM "ZONE OF INTEREST" SHOULD
BE CONSTRUED "NOT GRUDGINGLY BUT AS SERVING A BROADLY REMEDIAL
PURPOSE," AND AS GRANTING "GENEROUS REVIEW PROVISIONS" TO PERSONS
ADVERSELY EFFECTED OR AGGRIEVED.
As discussed in POINT 1, above, the Defendant Engineer has not
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cited in his Memorandum [R.300] even one case construing the term
"any person aggrieved11 as used in § 73-3-14 Utah Code Annotated,
1953, as amended.

On the other hand, the Plaintiffs have cited in

POINT 1, above, cases construing the term "any persons aggrieved"
which hold the Plaintiffs in the instant case would come within the
definition of this term as interpreted by the various federal and
state

courts.

In

an

attempt

to

find

cases

to

support

his

conclusion, the Engineer drifts into the "Zone of Interest" concept
discussed by some of the lower federal courts in construing Section
10 of the Administrative Procedures Act.
Unfortunately, the Engineer in his Memorandum in support of
his Motion For Summary Judgment [R. 300] failed to cite a very
recent case decided only last year by the United States Supreme
Court which interprets the term "Zone of Interest" and "aggrieved
persons" in a manner adverse to the position taken by the Engineer.
Clarke v. Securities Industries Association, 479 U.S.
S.Ct. 750, 93 L.Ed.2d- 757 (1987).

, 107

The Engineer's counsel knew

about this case because Plaintiffs1 counsel cited it at the hearing
in the trial court on August 6, 1987, and the Engineer's counsel
admitted he was aware of it.

Why the Engineer failed to cite this

case in his Memorandum is a mystery to the Plaintiffs, unless the
Engineer recognizes the United States Supreme Court has already
decided this issue adverse to the Engineer's position.
In Clarke, the United States Comptroller

of the Currency

granted two national banks the right to open affiliated offices
outside

of

their

own

state

of

-34-

incorporation.

This

was

an

administrative decision by a federal agency
Currency) ,
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equality between state and national banks.

This is the same

argument the Engineer is asking this Court to approve in his
instant Motion For Summary Judgment, that is, the water law review
provisions in § 73-3-14 are only to protect persons with vested
water rights, and, therefore, the Plaintiffs lack standing because
they did not own any water rights.
In responding to this argument, the United States District
Court, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, and the
United States Supreme Court all held the interpretation placed upon
§ 10 of the Administrative Procedures Act by the Comptroller of the
Currency "was too narrow a construction,ft and did not take into
account

the

Administrative

Procedure

Act's

provisions" and its "broadly remedial purpose."
interpreted

the statute to require an

"generous

review

The Comptroller

"aggrieved

person" to

demonstrate either a "legal interest" as that term had been
narrowly construed in the earlier United States Supreme Court
cases, or alternatively as requiring an explicit provision in the
relevant statute permitting suit by any party "adversely effected
or aggrieved.

The Plaintiffs submit the Engineer's arguments in

the instant case are precisely the same as those contended for by
the Comptroller of the Currency.
Section 10 of the Administrative Procedures Act [APA], 5
U.S.C. § 702 grants "standing to a person aggrieved by agency
action within the meaning of a relevant statute."
added].

[emphasis

This is similar to the words "any person aggrieved" in §

73-3-14 Utah Code Annotated.

The United States Supreme Court
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banks and the bank customers.

There was no serious question that

the data processors had sustained an injury in fact by virtue of
the Comptroller's action.

Rather, the question, which the Court

described as one of standing, was whether the data processors
should be heard to complain of that injury.

Similarly in the

instant case, the Engineer must admit the Plaintiffs have sustained
serious and substantial damages, as morely fully set forth in their
Second Amended Complaint; however, the Engineer has taken the
position the Plaintiffs should not be heard to complain of that
injury in an appeal from the Engineer's administrative agency
decision.
In Data Processing, the Court said the matter was basically
"one of interpreting congressional intent," and the Court looked
to § 10 of the Administrative Procedures Act which "grants standing
to a person 'aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a
relevant statute."' The Court of Appeals had interpreted § 702 of
the Administrative Procedures Act ("APA") as requiring either (1)
the showing of a "legal interest," as that term had been narrowly
construed

in

the

Supreme

Court's

earlier

cases,

or

(2)

alternatively as requiring an explicit provision in the relevant
statute permitting

suit by any party

"adversely

affected

or

aggrieved." The Supreme Court recognized it was unwilling to take
so narrow a view of the APA's "generous review provisions," and
stated that in accordance with previous decisions, the Act should
be construed "not grudgingly but as serving a broadly remedial
purpose." The Court then stated, "Accordingly, the data processors
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could be 'within that class of aggrieved persons' who under § 702
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broaden the class of protected persons at least f „ u:e same extent

Clarke, * ;>
liberal
• '•

leading
.•*:-!.

ourt n*;:.*-*

of

rh^

. u.•

, - "--l recent] y reaffirmed the

review

provisions

of

in a recent case —

the

Federal

Japan Whaling

Association v. American Cetecean Society, 4 78 U.S. 106 S.Ct. 2 8 60,
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92 L.Ed 2d 166 (1986).

In Japan Whaling, the Cetecean Society

sought judicial review of the Secretary of Commerce's refusal to
carry out his alleged duty under the Pelly Amendment of the
Fisherman's Protective Act of 1967 to certify Japan for taking
actions that diminished the effectiveness of the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling. The Secretary contended,
among other things, that the Cetecean Society had no private cause
of action under the Pelly Amendment.
The Court rejected this argument and expressly held the
Respondents did have a right of action "expressly created by the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which states that ' final agency
action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court [is]
subject

to

judicial

review,'

§ 704, at the behest

of

person...adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action."

'[a]
The

words "a person adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action,"
are virtually identical to the language found in § 73-3-14 which
allows

judicial

review

to

"any

person

aggrieved

by

any

decision...". Obviously, again, in 1986, the United States Supreme
Court wanted to enlarge or broaden the definition of "aggrieved"
persons who were protected and who had a right of appeal from
Federal Administrative Procedures Act agency decisions.

This is

exactly the case we have in the instant action wherein an official
Utah State agency decision is involved.
In Japan Whaling, the Supreme Court cited from an earlier
decision and went even further in making a stronger case for
enlarging the class of protected persons.
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, *t

lended war- * • *
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that
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l#

"adversely

pei^on
on tl le
t< : > I : .1 le

affected

aggrieved," i.e., injured in fact, the additional requirement that
"the

interest

sought to be protected

by the Complainant

[be]

arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated
by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question."
The Court recognized the "Zone of Interest" formula in Data
Processing

has

not

proved

self-explanatory,

"but

significant

guidance can nonetheless be drawn from that opinion.
Court

interpreted

broadly...Second.

the

phrase

f

a

relevant

First.

statute1

in

The

§

The Court approved the "trend...toward

702
[the]

enlargement of the class of people who may protest administrative
action...The Court struck the balance in a manner favoring review,
but excluding those would-be plaintiffs not even 'arguably within
the

zone

of

statute...'"

interest

to

be

protected

or

regulated

by

the

[emphasis added]

The Court continued discussing the zone-of-interest test in
part as follows:

[3b]
The zone of interest test is a guide for
deciding whether, in view of Congress1 evident intent to
make agency action presumptively reviewable, a particular
plaintiff should be heard to complain of a particular
agency decision...The test is not meant to be especially
demanding; in particular, there need be no indication of
congressional purpose to benefit the would-be plaintiff,
[emphasis added]
Thus, the United States Supreme Court in discussing the "Zone
of Interest" concept stated that the Congress1 [in Utah it would
be the Legislature's] "evident intent" was to make agency action
presumptively

reviewable.

The class

of persons

protected

is

broadened and there need be no indication of congressional purpose
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has the broad appeal protection afforded by the Administrative
Procedures Act, even though that party was not present in the
agency proceedings itself. This was also the holding in the Kramer
v. Virgin Islands case, supra.

See discussion in Point 2 of this

Brief dealing with the Kramer case.
In LSI, the Federal

Circuit

interpret the "standing" issue.

Court relied

on

Clarke to

The Court discussed this matter

in part as follows:
The Supreme Court has recognized similar language
in other statutes providing appellate standing to 'all
persons adversely affected.'
[Citation to Clarke
omitted]. Moreover in Clarke, the Supreme Court applied
a 'zone of interest1 test for determining standing to
appeal from an administrative decision, first set forth
in Ass'n. of Data Processing Service Org., Inc. v. Camp.
397 US 150, 153, 90 S.Ct. 827, 829 25 L.Ed 2d 184 (1970),
where the statute involved is without an explicit
provision specifying who may appeal. Thus, even when a
statute does not explicitly provide for appeals by nonparty "persons" appellate standing is not necessarily
limited to parties only.
That result reflects the
Supreme Court's recognition in Data Processing of a
1
trend... toward [the] enlargement of a class of people
who may protest administrative action.f
Thus it appears clear the Circuit Courts of Appeal are
interpreting Clarke, Data Processing, Japan Whaling, and other
cases to be a recognition there is a trend toward enlarging the
class of people who may protest administrative actions, and even
when the statute

involved

does not have explicit provisions

specifying who may appeal, the rule is that persons should be
allowed in, even though they were not parties in the administrative
proceedings

"absent

some

clear

and

convincing

evidence

of

legislative intention to preclude review."
For the foregoing reasons, the Plaintiffs submit even under
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the persons protected,

POINT 4
THE ENGINEER'S DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES CLEARLY OUTI JNED
IN § 73-3-8 UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, AS AMENDED, DO APPLY TO
PERMANENT CHANGE APPLICATIONS COVERED BY § 73-3-3, BECAUSE § 73-33(2) EXPRESSLY MAKES THESE DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES APPLICABLE
TO CHANGE APPLICATIONS, AND BECAUSE THERE IS NO RATIONAL BASIS FOR
EXCLUDING THEM.
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The last POINT, POINT II, raised by the Engineer in his
Memorandum [R. 300] deals with the issue of whether the duties and
responsibilities which the Utah legislature imposed on the State
Engineer in § 73-3-8 —

to conduct adequate investigations and to

ensure the public welfare would not be endangered —

apply to

Permanent Change Applications or only to "Original" Applications.
Again, the Engineer has not cited one case in its Memorandum
dealing with this issue. There is no language from any case cited
that specifically holds the duties and responsibilities clearly set
forth in § 73-3-8 do not apply to permanent Change Applications.
Because of this lack of any authority, the Plaintiffs submit the
interpretation placed on the statute by the Engineer is the
Engineer's own personal interpretation, and is in fact contrary to
the express language adopted by the Utah legislature in § 73-3-3(2)
which makes the duties and responsibilities in § 73-3-8 applicable
to Change Application.
In their Second Amended Complaint, the Plaintiffs allege the
Engineer erred
Addendum]

in

in his Memorandum
that

he

did

not

Decision
comply

[copy

with

the

included
duties

in
and

responsibilities which the Utah legislature had imposed upon him
in § 73-3-8 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, because he did
not adequately investigate the allegations which the Plaintiff's
witnesses testified to and which the documentary evidence clearly
supported at the formal hearing in the Engineer's office.

These

witnesses and this evidence demonstrated clearly that approval of

-46-

the Change Application would be detr i mental Id t lie puhln' wolfaio.
Secti on 7 3-3-8 reads in part: as fol lows:
j£ t j l e s tate engineer, because of information in 1 li s
possession obtained either by his own investigation or
otherwise, has reason to believe that an application to
appropriate water . . . will unreasonably effect public
recreation or will prove detrimental to the public
welfare, it is his duty to withhold his approval or
rejection of the application until he has investigated
the matter.
If the application does not meet the
requirements of this section, it shall be rejected.
[emphasis added]
the Defendants1 Permanent Change
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* -i* -itorily mandated I i iThe Fnaino^r n *o** - o t

.-'ir, .:.*,

!

• •;»

,•

•, s

now, after conducting this ten-month on-site inspection, etc., he
really didn't need to do so and only did it presumably to be a
"good sport!"
negligent

In attempting to escape responsibility

investigation,

investigation

can

impose

the

Engineer

liability

on

now

contends

him

only

for his
any

where

such
he

is

investigating original water applications under § 73-3-2, but has
absolutely no bearing on Change Applications, § 73-3-3, even though
substantial damage to private and public property results from his
approval of the Change Application!
So, now, after going through all this on-site investigation
and other research, at a substantial investment of time and money
from the state purse, the Engineer now wants this Court to believe
he really didn't have to make such an investigation, and the duties
and responsibilities imposed upon him by § 73-3-8, under which he
made the investigation, really don't apply after all to Change
Applications.

The Plaintiffs submit this is a futile attempt to

torture the clear language in §§ 73-3-3 and 73-3-8 to reach an
erroneous result sought by the Engineer to escape liability for his
negligent investigation.
Section 73-3-3 by its own terms makes the procedures and
provisions of § 73-3-8 applicable to a Permanent Change Application
as opposed to a "Temporary" Change Application.

Section 73-3-3(2)

expressly states in part "...The procedure in the state engineer's
office and the rights and duties of the applicants with respect to
applications for permanent changes of point of diversion, place,
or purpose of use shall be the same as provided in this Title for
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applications to appropriate water;

"

[emphasis added].

The

Plaintiffs submit the legislati ire con] d not have been more cl ear
ni ni i

• A p i O L * S 111" i

duties
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mi i in'
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Draper

an: ti le

Section

Engineer

wi th

respect

to jChange Applications,

• -3 -3(2) says those duti es and responsibilities shal I be
. 1

Applications,

THE ENGINEER HIMSELF ADMITS HE WOULD HAVE HAD A DUTY

TO MAKE THE INVESTIGATION IN S 73-3-8 IF THE APPLICATION SUBMITTED
Cha* EN LANTij W A u tn» v n i o u N A L
CHANGE APPLICATION.
Engineer's

Memorandum
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applications to appropriate water under §7 3-3-8, but as
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discussed in Point II, infra, such criteria do not apply to Change
Applications."

[R. 309].

Since the State Engineer in footnote

1 on page 9 of its

Memorandum admits the damages of the Plaintiffs sustained would
have to be considered under § 73-3-8 in an Original Application,
and since the Utah legislature in 73-3-3(2) expressly made these
same duties for an Original Application applicable to a Change
Application, the Engineer

is hard pressed

to come up with an

argument as to why he should not comply with these clear duties and
responsibilities in § 73-3-8 when considering Change Applications.
In fact, he does not meet this burden anywhere in his Memorandum.
It is noteworthy § 73-3-8 states "It shall be the duty of the
State Engineer to approve an application if:..." [emphasis added].
This language does not purport in any way to limit the term "an
application" only to an Original Application to appropriate water
under § 73-3-2.

It would have been easy to have done so either by

simply stating "an Original Application" or by saying § 73-3-8 only
applied to § 73-3-2 Applications.

Obviously the legislature did

not intend

it specifically

such limitation, when

included

the

language in § 73-3-3 making Permanent Change Applications subject
to the same procedures and imposed upon the applicants the same
duties as provided in Title 73 for "Applications to Appropriate
Water."
Since the applicants —
- had the duty

Draper and the Conservancy District -

found in § 73-1-8 to "maintain their ditches,

canals, flumes or other water courses in repair so as to prevent
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the Utah Supreme Court to include a multitude of damages such as
alleged in the Plaintiffs1 Second Amended Complaint.

In Tanner v.

Bacon, 136 P.2d 957 (Utah 1943) the Utah Supreme Court was called
upon

to

determine

"detrimental

to

what

public

the

legislature

welfare."

The

meant

Court

by

the

reviewed

words
several

statutes in other jurisdictions and concluded in these words on
page 964 of the P.2d Reports:
[17, 18] The State Engineer is also required by the
statute to reject an application where in his opinion its
approval
'would prove detrimental
to the public
welfare.' . . . These decisions hold that anything which is
not for the best interest of the public would be
'detrimental to the public welfare.'...
Under this
construction the State Engineer was authorized to reject
or limit the priority of plaintiff's application in the
interest of the public welfare. [emphasis added].
Obviously, the Utah Supreme Court has interpreted the term
"detrimental to the public welfare" as broadly as possible by
holding it means "anything which is not for the best interest of
the public."

Had the Engineer in the instant case complied with

the duties and responsibilities imposed upon his office by § 73-38 and made the investigation required therein, he would have easily
determined the following facts which clearly are detrimental to the
"public welfare" as defined in Tanner, supra. All of these factual
allegations

are

set

out

in

the

Plaintiffs'

Second

Amended

Complaint, and they must be regarded as true in a Motion for
Summary Judgment, where there are not controverting affidavits on
discovery arguments.
1.

The Plaintiffs and each of them had enjoyed the peaceable

possession of their properties for more than twenty years prior to
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the

time

Defendants
f

offi^-

disturbed

submitted

their

Change

Applicati on to t: .he

* ab st atp Engineer•

:

their peaceable possess!

wate* d^maqr caused :
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A:

t llei i wiLt

v, . • ,

which improvements consisted of a screwqat^ diversion stru< turf

Sandy, Utah.
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open ditches to the south to the Defendants' water treatment pJant
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in Draper, Utah as had been done historically.

Instead, when the

screwgate is closed, the water has no place to go but down the
hillside onto Plaintiffs1 properties*
1984

like

a

Niagara

Falls

and

This water fell in 1983 and

thoroughly

gutted

Plaintiffs*

properties destroying fences, depositing large boulders and other
debris, cutting roads the Plaintiffs needed for their horse and
cattle business, splitting a public highway, Dimple Dell Road, and
eating away large portions of other public property owned by the
Salt Lake County Recreation Department in an area where a proposed
public park will be built.

This damage has the potential to recur

each time the screwgate is shut which can happen any time the
defendants desire to do so.
6.

Prior

to

the

installation

of

the

screwgate

and

in

approximately April-May of 1983, the Defendants were engaged in
constructing a pipeline in the vicinity where the screwgate was
later located, and in the construction of the said pipeline, the
Defendants allowed waters in their ditches being conveyed from the
vicinity of the Bell Canyon Reservoir to the water treatment plant
in Draper, Utah, to escape from the ditch facilities and to flood
the

Plaintiffs1

properties

causing

extensive

damage

to

the

properties.
7.

As a result of the escape of the said water, not only

were the private properties of the Plaintiffs damaged, but also
there was substantial damage to public property including Dimple
Dell Road, Wasatch Boulevard, and public land to the west of Dimple
Dell Road owned by the Salt Lake County Recreation Department and
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which was to be used for a park for the public enjoyment of the
residents of Salt Lake County.
8.

All this damage to the private and public properties

could have been prevented had the State Engineer conducted the
investigation

required

of him

in § 73-3-8

and

had

the

State

Engineer rejected the Change Application, or in the alternative
approved the Change Application subject to the condition the other
Defendants

would

make

adequate

and

reasonable

provision

for

conveying waters in their ditches and other water works in a manner
that would not cause flooding to the Plaintiffs1 properties onto
public roads, parks and other public property.
As noted above, the Engineer has not cited one case either
from Utah or any other state or federal court interpreting the
precise

issue discussed

in this Point

4, to-wit, whether the

Engineer's duties and responsibilities clearly set forth in § 733-8 apply to Permanent Change Applications described in § 73-3-3
or apply only to original water applications described in § 73-32.

Likewise, the Plaintiffs have not been able to find any cases

from Utah specifically discussing this point, and this is why the
Plaintiffs say this issue is one of first impression in the state.
There is, however, a comment in a dissenting opinion by one of the
noted scholars formerly on this Court which bears on this issue.
Although a dissenting opinion normally is not the law of the case,
the context in which Justice Wolfe discusses the application of the
predecessor of § 73-3-8 and its application to the successor of §
73-3-3 does have general bearing on this issue.
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In Movie v. Salt Lake City, 176 P.2d 882 (Utah 1947), and on
pages 888-902 of his dissent, Justice Wolfe reviews the development
of the Utah Water Law.

Although the case dealt with conflicting

claims by prior appropriators and also the rule of beneficial use,
Justice

Wolfe

on page

895 made

a statement

in passing

which

Plaintiffs submit bears directly on the issues in this case.
comments

do

not

necessarily

even

deal

with

the

issues

The

being

discussed by Judge Wolfe, but the fact he made them, and the fact
the majority opinion does not disagree with him, is good authority
for the proposition the Court recognized these fundamental concepts
did exist in general vogue at that time.

Justice Wolfe's comments

on page 895 of the Pacific 2d Reports on this point are as follows:
It should be noted that in case of an application
for a permanent change as compared to a temporary change,
the procedure shall be the same as is provided for in
applications to appropriate water. [In other words, the
permanent change application procedures in § 73-3-3 shall
be the same in those in § 73-3-2.]
Section 100-3-8
U.C.A. 194 3, [which is the predecessor and virtually
identical in language to § 73-3-8 Utah Code Annotated,
1953, as amended] declares when it shall be the duty of
the State Engineer to approve an application. The right
of the applicant is not absolute.
The Engineer is
required to determine certain facts some of which involve
the element of judgment. In the case of an application
for a temporary change of use, the Engineer 'Shall make
an order authorizing the change1 'If such temporary
change does not impair any vested rights of others.' The
Shurtleff case was evidently based largely on the
conception of a vested right either complete or incoate
as appears from the quoted portion of that case set out
above. But the word "shall" is used in § 100-3-3 [which
is the predecessor and virtually identical to § 73-3-3
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended] only in connection
with an application for a temporary change of place of
diversion or place or purpose of use. [emphasis added]
Justice Wolfe noted it was the practice in his day for the
Engineer to have the same duties and responsibilities with respect
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to permanent change applications which he did with respect original
applications to appropriate water in § 73-3-2.
In conclusion, then, the Plaintiffs submit the duties and
responsibilities placed upon the Engineer in § 73-3-8 must be
followed in considering a permanent change application under § 733-3 [as opposed to a temporary change application] to the same
extent the Engineer must follow these duties and responsibilities
when considering an original water application under § 73-3-2. In
the

Plaintiffs1

Second

Amended

Complaint, they

have

alleged

substantial negligence on the part of the Engineer in conducting
and undertaking the § 73-3-8 investigation, and these allegations
of negligence raise genuine issues of fact which would preclude the
granting of the Engineer's Motion For Summary Judgment.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Plaintiffs respectfully
submit the Defendant Utah State Engineer's Motion For Summary
Judgment should be denied, the Engineer should be reinstated as a
party defendant in the lawsuit, and the Plaintiffs should be
allowed to continue with discovery and the trial of this case
against all defendants including the Engineer.
DATED this 26th day of August, 1988.
Respectfully Submitted,
JAMES A. MCINTOSH & ASSOQ*£fES~>vC.

AMES A. MCINTOSH
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 29th day of August, 1988, four
true and correct copies of the foregoing APPELLANTS! BRIEF were
delivered to Michael M. Quealy, Assistant Attorney General, 1636
West North Temple, Suite 300, Salt Lake City, Utah 84116.

/JAMES A. MCINTOSH
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ADDENDUM EXHIBIT NO.

UTAH STATE ENGINEER'S MEMORANDUM DECISION
DATED DECEMBER 26, 1985, INVOLVING CHANGE
APPLICATION NO. 57-3411 (al3077)
CONSTITUTIONAL
PROVISIONS
INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE
(a)

3.

4.

ARTICLE
I,
CONSTITUTION

SECTION

II,

WHOSE
UTAH

STATUTORY PROVISIONS WHOSE INTERPRETATION
IS DETERMINATIVE. ALL REFERENCES ARE TO
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, AS AMENDED.
(a)

SECTION 73-3-3

3

(b)

SECTION 73-3-8

4

(c)

SECTION 73-3-14

5

"JUDGMENT AND ORDER EXPRESSLY DIRECTING
ENTRY OF JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO RULE 54(b)"
SIGNED ON MARCH
14, 1988, BY THE
HONORABLE JUDGE RAYMOND S. UNO.

BEFORE THE STATE ENGINEER OF THE STATE OF UTAH
IN THE MATTER OF CHANGE APPLICATION

)

NUMBER 57-3411 (a!3077)

)

)

MEMORANDUM DEC

Change Application Number 57-3411 (al3077) was filed by the
Draper Irrigation Company and the Salt Lake County Water Conservancy District to change the point of diversion, place and nature
of use of water rights as evidenced by Decree #3429, 57-3411
(D47), and 57-443 (A13830), titled in the name of the Draper Irrigation Company; the Salt Lake County Water Conservancy District
being entitled to the use of portions of said water rights by
virtue of an agreement entered into with the Draper Irrigation
Company.
It was proposed to change one-half of the entire flow of water in
Bell Canyon (North Dry Creek), all the waters of Middle and South
Forks Cry Creek, all but 0.18 cfs. of Rocky Mouth and Big Willow
Creeks, and 1.4 cfs. of water saved as described in water user
claim 57-443 from the same sources as described above.
Water has been diverted at poin ts as follows: North Dry CreekNorth 17o 10' East 5020 feet, M iddle Fork Dry Creek- North 23o
10ff East 2420 feet, South Fork Dry Creek- North 77o 10• East 2020
feet, Big Willow Creek- South 3 3o 10* West 5055 feet, and Rocky
Mouth Creek- South 39o 15' West 3915 feet, all from the NE
Corner, Section 23, T3S, R1E, S LB&M, and 9,559.5 acre-feet of
water has been used from Januar y 1 to December for domestic,
municipal, storage, industrial, and stockwatering purposes, and
from April 1 to September 30 fo r the irrigation of 2716 acres,
All water uses were within sect ions 7, 8, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 25,
27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, and 36, T3S, R1E, SLB&M, and sections
4, 5, and 6,,T4S, R1E, SLB&M.
It was proposed to divert 9,559.5 acre-feet of water from the
same sources with flow rates as heretofore, to be diverted from
points as follows: North Dry Creek- South 750 feet and East 4121
feet from the Nl/4 Corner, Section 14, Middle Fork Dry Creek- \
South 2783 feet East 3225 feet from the :Nl/4 Corner, Section 14,
South Fork Dry Creek- North 306 feet and East 992 feet from the
Sl/4 Corner, Section 14, Big Willow Creek- South 2609 feet and
West 853 feet from the Nl/4 Corner, Section 23, and Rocky Mouth
Creek- South 2389 feet and West 493 feet from the Nl/4 Corner,
Section 23, all T3S, R1E, SLB&M.
The portion of the water to be used by the Draper Irrigation Company would be for the period from January 1, to December 31, and
would include domestic, stockwatering, commercial, fire protection, and other purposes incidental to the requirements of Draper
City, which would be provided both raw water from the mountain
streams herein described, and treated water from the Draper
Treatment Plant, which is operated by the Company. The Company
would also irrigate 1790.7 acres from April 1 to September 30.
» <-
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MEMORANDUM DECISION
CHANGE APPLICATION NUMBER
57-3411 (al3077)
PAGE - 2 The Salt Lake County Water Conservancy District proposed to use
water following treatment at it's Southeast Regional Water Treatment Plant, from January 1, to December 31 for municipal purposes
within the Salt Lake County Water Conservancy Districts boundaries. The change application was advertised in the Deseret News
from June 28, 1984 through July 12, 1984, and was protested by
Stanley B. Donhanw
A hearing was held in Salt Lake City on February 26, 1985 and was
attended by the applicants representatives, and the protestant
with liis representatives. At the hearing the applicants stated
that Draper Irrigation Company had a contract with Salt Lake
County Water Conservancy District which allowed the District to
utilize portions of the Company's water for municipal purposes,
following treatment at the Districts treatment plant, and that
the subject change application had been precipitated by this contractual agreement.
The protestant stated that as a result of the project construction, his property was flooded in 1983 and 1984 causing extensive
property damage, and that the now-completed project was constructed such that further flooding of this property could occur
in the future due to project maintenance, or for other causes at
the option of the District. He further stated that the District
had not obtained permits allowing them to discharge water from
their system, and that the project as constructed was detrimental
to the public welfare.
In an effort.to gain additional information relative to this matter, the State Engineer's Staff conducted a field review on May
7, 1985. Representatives of both the applicant and protestant
were present for the review, which included observations of alleged damage to the protestant's property, along with observations of the District's construction which took place in connection with temporary water rights change applications approved by
the State Engineer.
In a review of the foregoing, the State Engineer concludes that:
1.

He is without authority relative to damages which may have
been sustained in connection with project construction
which occurred as a result of his reaction to water right
applications; therefore, this issue does not apply to
this change application.

2.

The State Engineer is not in receipt of evidence indicating that existing water rights will be impaired if this
change application is implemented.

In consideration of these conclusions, it is the opinion of the
State Engineer that this application can be approved.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
CHANGE APPLICATION NUMBER
57-3411 (al3077)
PAGE -3This decision is subject to the provisions of Section 73-3-14,
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, which provides for plenary review by
the filing of a civil action in the appropriate district court
within sixty days from the date hereof.
Dated this 26th day of December 1985.

frg-*^
Robert L. Morgan, p<E., State Engineer
RLM:EDF:laz
Mailed a copy of the foregoing Memorandum Decision this 26th day
of December, 1985 to:
Draper Irrigation Co.
2582 South 950 East
Draper, UT 84020
Salt
P.O.
3495
Salt

Lake Water Cons. Dist.
Box 15618
South 300 West
Lake City, UT 85115

Stanley B. Bonham
10741 Dimple Del Road
Sandy, UT 84092
4

James A. Mcintosh
James A. Mcintosh and Assoc.
Suite 14, Intrade Bldg. So.
1399 South 700 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84105

i
D. Brent Rose
% Clyde & Pratt
2 00 American Savings Plaza
7 7 West Second South
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Lee Kapaloski
% Kapaloski, Kinghorn & P e t e r s
10 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

BY:

_
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. a u r e l A. Zundel, S e c r e t a r y
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ARTICLE I, SECTION II, UTAH CONSTITUTION
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done
to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by
due course of law, which shall be administered without denial or
unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred from prosecuting
or defending before any tribunal in this State, by himself or
counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party.
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SECTION 73-3-3 UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, AS AMENDED
Change of place of diversion or use — Right to — Permanent
or temporary — Application — Contents — Investigation — Notice
and hearing — Deposit to cover expenses — No effect on priority
of original application — Violation as misdemeanor — Exception
as to replacement wells — Division of Wildlife Resources may file
applications —
Purposes —
Conditions —
Finality of state
engineer's determination.
(1) Any person entitled to the use of water may change the
place of diversion or use and may use the water for other purposes
than those for which it was originally appropriated, but no such
change may be made if it impairs any vested right without just
compensation.
These changes may be permanent or temporary.
Changes for an indefinite length of time with an intention to
relinquish the original point of diversion, place, or purpose of
use are defined as permanent changes. Temporary changes include
and are limited to all changes for definitely fixed periods of not
exceeding one year. Both permanent and temporary changes of point
of diversion, place, or purpose of use of water including water
involved in general adjudication or other suits, shall be made in
the manner provided in this section.
(2) No change may be made unless the change application is
approved by the state engineer. Applications shall be made upon
forms furnished by the state engineer and shall set forth: the name
of the applicant; a description of the water right; the quantity
of water; the stream or source; the point on the stream or source
where the water is diverted; the point to which it is proposed to
change the diversion of the water; the place, purpose, and extent
of the proposed use; and any other information that the state
engineer may require. The procedure in the state engineerfs office
and the rights and duties of the applicants with respect to
applications for permanent changes of point of diversion, place,
or purpose of use shall be the same as provided in this title for
applications to appropriate water; but the state engineer may, in
connection with applications for permanent change involving only
a change in point of diversion of 660 feet or less, waive the
necessity for publishing a notice of application.
The state
engineer shall investigate all temporary change applications and
if he finds that the temporary change will not impair any vested
rights of others, he shall make an order authorizing the change.
If he finds that the change sought might impair vested rights, he
shall give notice of the application to all persons whose rights
might be affected by the change and shall give them an opportunity
to be heard before authorizing the change. The notice may be given
by regular mail at least five days before the hearing or by one
publication in a newspaper of general circulation in the county in
which the original point of diversion or place of use is located
five days before the hearing. Before making an investigation or
giving notice, the state engineer may require the applicant to
deposit a sum of money sufficient to pay the expenses of the
investigation and publication of notice.
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(3) Applications for either permanent or temporary changes
may not be rejected for the sole reason that the change would
impair the vested rights of others, but if otherwise proper, they
may be approved as to part of the water involved or upon the
condition that conflicting rights are acquired*
(4) Any person holding an approved application for the
appropriation of water may either permanently or temporarily change
the point of diversion, place, or purpose of use, but no such
change of an approved application may affect the priority of the
original application; except that no change of point of diversion,
place, or nature of use set forth in an approved application
operates to enlarge the time within which the construction of work
shall begin or be completed.
(5) Any person who changes or who attempts to change a point
of diversion, place, or purpose of use, either permanently or
temporarily, without first applying to the state engineer in the
manner provided in this section, obtains no right and is guilty of
a misdemeanor, each day of such unlawful change constituting a
separate offense, separately punishable.
(6) The provisions of this section do not apply to the
replacement of an existing well by a new well drilled within a
radius of 150 feet from the point of diversion from the existing
well, and no such replacement well shall be drilled except upon
compliance with the requirements of Section 73-3-28.
(7)(a)
The Division of Wildlife Resources may file
applications for permanent or temporary changes, in accordance with
the requirements of this section: (i) on perfected water rights
presently owned by the Division of Wildlife Resources; or (ii) on
perfected water rights purchased by that division through funding
provided for that purpose by legislative appropriation, or acquired
by lease, agreement, gift, exchange, contribution; or (iii) on
appurtenant water rights acquired with the acquisition of real
property for other wildlife purposes.
(b) Changes allowed in Subsection (7)(a) shall only be for
the limited purpose of providing water for instream flows in
natural channels necessary for the preservation or propagation of
fish within a designated section of a natural stream channel. This
subsection does not allow enlargement of the water right sought to
be changed nor may the change impair any vested water right.
(c)
An application filed by the Division of Wildlife
Resources shall, in addition to the other requirements of this
section, set forth the points on the natural stream between which
the necessary instream flows will be provided by the change and
shall be accompanied by appropriate studies, reports, or other
information required by the state engineer demonstrating the
necessity for such instream flows in the specified section of the
natural stream, and the projected benefits to the public fishery
which will result from the change.
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(d) The Division of Wildlife Resources may not acquire
title or a long-term interest in a water right for the purposes
provided in Subsection (7)(b) without prior legislative approval.
After obtaining this approval, the Division of Wildlife Resources
may file a request for a permanent change as provided in Subsection
(7) (a).
(e) This Subsection (7) does not authorize the Division
of Wildlife Resources to (i) appropriate unappropriated water under
Section 73-3-2 for the purpose of providing instream flows, or (ii)
acquire water rights by eminent domain for instream flows or for
any other purpose.
(f) This Subsection (7) shall only apply to applications
filed on or after April 28, 1986.
(8) The determination of the state engineer is final, unless
an action to review his decision is filed within the time and in
the manner provided Section 73-3-14.
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SECTION 73-3-8 UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, AS AMENDED
Approval or rejection of application —
Requirements for
approval — Application for specified period of time — Filing of
royalty contract for removal of salt or minerals.
(1) It shall be the duty of the state engineer to approve an
application if: (a) there is unappropriated water in the proposed
source; (b) the proposed use will not impair existing rights or
interfere with the more beneficial use of the water; (c) the
proposed plan is physically and economically feasible, unless the
application is filed by the United States Bureau of Reclamation,
and would not prove detrimental to the public welfare; (d) the
applicant has the financial ability to complete the proposed works;
and (e) the application was filed in good faith and not for
purposes of speculation or monopoly.
If the state engineer,
because of information in his possession obtained either by his own
investigation or otherwise, has reason to believe that an
application to appropriate water will interfere with its more
beneficial use for irrigation, domestic or culinary, stock
watering, power or mining development or manufacturing, or will
unreasonably affect public recreation or the natural stream
environment, or will prove detrimental to the public welfare, it
is his duty to withhold his approval or rejection of the
application until he has investigated the matter.
If an
application does not meet the requirements of this section, it
shall be rejected.
(2)
An application to appropriate water for industrial,
power, mining development, manufacturing purposes, agriculture, or
municipal purposes may be approved for a specific and certain
period from the time the water is placed to beneficial use under
the application, but in no event may an application be granted for
a period of time less than that ordinarily needed to satisfy the
essential and primary purpose of the application or until the water
is no longer available as determined by the state engineer. At the
expiration of the period fixed by the state engineer the water
shall revert to the public and is subject to appropriation as
provided by Title 73. The state engineer may extend any limited
water right upon a showing that the essential purpose of the
original application has not been satisfied, that the need for an
extension is not the result of any default or neglect by the
applicant, and that water is still available; except no extension
shall exceed the time necessary to satisfy the primary purpose of
the original application. A request for extension must be filed
in writing in the office of the state engineer not later than 60
days before the expiration date of the application.
(3) Before the approval of any application for the
appropriations of water from navigable lakes or streams of the
state which contemplates the recovery of salts and other minerals
therefrom by precipitation or otherwise, the applicant shall file
with the state engineer a copy of a contract for the payment of
royalties to the state of Utah. The approval of an application
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shall be revoked in the event of the failure of the applicant to
comply with terms of his royalty contract.

EXHIBIT

SECTION 73-3-14 UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, AS AMENDED
Review by courts of engineer's decisions.
In any case where a decision of the state engineer is involved
any person aggrieved by the decision may within 60 days after
notice bring a civil action in the district court for a plenary
review. The state engineer shall give notice of his decision by
mailing a copy by regular mail to the applicant and to each
protestant. Notice is considered to have been given on the date
of mailing. The place of trial, subject to the power of the court
to change it as provided by law, shall be in the county in which
the stream or water source, or some part of it, is located. The
state engineer shall be joined as a defendant in all suits to
review his decisions, but no judgment for costs or expenses of the
litigation may be rendered against him. Parties shall be served
with process as in other cases and notice of the pendency of the
action shall be filed by the clerk of the district court with the
state engineer within 20 days after it is commenced, which operates
to stay all further proceedings pending the decision of the
district court. Review of the decision of the district court shall
be by the Supreme Court.
Venue for judicial review —

State engineer as defendant.

(1)(a) Any person aggrieved by an order of the state engineer
may obtain judicial review by following the procedures and
requirements of Chapter 46b, Title 63.
(b) Venue for judicial review of informal adjudicative
proceedings shall be in the county in which the stream or water
source, or some part of it, is located.
(2) The state engineer shall be joined as defendant in all
suits to review his decisions, but no judgment for costs or
expenses of the litigation may be rendered against him.
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FILED IN CLERK'S OFFlCe.
Salt Lake County Utah

DAVID L. WILKINSON, No. 3472
, MAR H 1988
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL
DALLIN W. JENSEN, No. 1669
Solicitor General
W .»
•—
* C«.f*JtMICHAEL M. QUEALY, No. 2667
1
Assistant Attorney General
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT UTAH STATE ENGINEER
1636 West North Temple, Suite 300
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84116
Telephone: (801) 533-4446

Ct«fK

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STANLEY B. BONHAM and ANNE M.
BONHAM; BOYD F. SUMMERRAYS and
ARLEEN M. SUMMERHAYS,
JUDGMENT AMD ORDER
EXPRESSLY DIRECTING
ENTRY OF JUDGMKRT
PURSUANT TO RULE 54(b)

Plaintiffs,

ROBERT L. MORGAN, Utah State
Engineer; SALT LAKE COUNTY WATER
CONSERVANCY DISTRICT, a political
subdivision of the State of Utah
and a body corporate; and DRAPER
IRRIGATION COMPANY, a Utah
corporation,

Civil No. C-86-1341
(Judge Raymond S. Uno)

Defendants.

Defendant Utah State Engineer's Motion for Summary Judgment
on Count I of Plaintiffs1 Second Amended Complaint came before
the Court for hearing on November 20, 1987.

Further conferences

were held betweei. the Court and counsel by telephone on November
30, 1987 and December 7, 1987.
James A. Mcintosh.

Plaintiffs are represented by

Defendant Utah State Engineer is represented

by Dallm W. Jensen and Michael M. Quealy.

Defendants Draper

CVUIDIT

Irrigation Company and Salt Lake County Water Conservancy District are represented by Lee E. Kapaloskl and ~.>Roy S. Axland,
respectively.
The Court having reviewed the filer including the affidavits
and memoranda of counsel submitted on the present mot:on; having
heard and considered the arguments of counsel, and the Court
being fully advised in this matter concludes that the change application process under Section 73-3-3 U.C.A. is narrow in scope;
that the issues raised by Plaintiffs are outside the limited
criteria governing the approval and rejection of change applications; and that Plaintiffs are not "aggrieved persons" within the
meaning of Section 73-3-14 U.C.A..

The Court therefore grants

the Motion of Defendant Utah State Engineer for Summary Judgment.
Further, the Court has indicated orally in explaining its ruling
to counsel that while Plaintiffs are not entitled to bring an
action to review the Decision of the State Entinker, their protest and participation before the State Engineer har placed Defendants Salt Lake County Water Conservancy District and Draper
Irrigation Company on notice of Plaintiffs' concerns, so as to
preserve Plaintiffs' claim for punitive damages as pleaded elsewhere in the Second Amended Complaint.
Therefore, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED, that
Defendant State Engineer's Motion for Summary Judgment be, and is
hereby granted, and that judgment is hereby entered against
Plaintiffs, dismissing with prejudice Count I of Plaintiffs*
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Second Amended Complaint, which is the only Count therein
directed at the State Engineer-

This jvdgrsent does not affect

the allegations against the other Defendants as set fortn in
Plaintiffs1 Second amended Complaint.
The Court hereby expressly determines that there is no just
reason for delay and hereby expressly directs that t-his judgment
be entered as a final judgment within the meaning of Rule 54(b)
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Each party shall bear its own costs.
DATED this /T

day of Fihmwnry, 1988.
BY THE COURT*

RAYMOND S. UNO
District Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing proposed JUDGMENT AND ORDER EXPRESSLY DIRECTING ENTRY OF
JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO RULB 54(b), was served by mailing the same,
first class postage prepaid, this 4th day of February, 1988, to:
James A* Mcintosh
Attorney at Law
Intrade Building South #14
1399 South 700 Bast
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84105
LeRoy S. Axland
Attorney at Law
175 South West Temple
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84101
Lee E. Kapaloski
Attorney at Law
185 South State Street
P.O. Box 11898
SALT LAKE CITY UT 8414?

MICHAEL H. Q

Assistant Att<
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